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No. 20060853-CA

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
MICHAEL STRAND and CARI ALLEN,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.
DIANA TELFER, and JANE DOES (1-5),
Defendants-Appellees,

ANSWER BRIEF OF APPELLEE DIANA TELFER
Defendant-Appellee Diana Telfer submits this brief in answer to
the Brief of Appellants Michael Strand and Cari Allen.

Statement of Jurisdiction
This is an appeal from a final judgment of dismissal of the Third
Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, entered on
August 21, 2006. R. 121-24; Add. A. Appellants filed their notice of
appeal on September 18, 2006. R. 125-26. This Court has jurisdiction to
hear this appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(j) (West 2004)

providing for jurisdiction in this Court over cases transferred to the
Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court.

Issues Presented
1.

The trial court correctly granted Telfer's motion to dismiss
because Telfer is absolutely immune from claims of libel and
slander
Telfer was an attorney guardian ad litem who was appointed to

represent the children in a divorce action. Utah law is clear that
attorneys are absolutely immune from any and all claims arising out of
statements that are relevant to and made in the course of judicial
proceedings. Is Telfer immune from the appellants' claims of libel and
slander arising out of statements she made in a motion for temporary
restraining order and supporting memorandum filed in the divorce
action?

A.

Standard of review

'When determining whether a trial court properly granted a
motion to dismiss, [this Court] accept[s] the factual allegations in the
complaint as true and consider[s] them, and all reasonable inferences to
be drawn from them, in the light most favorable to the non-moving
2

party." Krouse v. Bower, 2001 UT 28 <H 2, 20 R3d 895. The trial court's
decision to grant a motion to dismiss raises a question of law, which
this Court reviews for correctness, according no deference to the trial
court. Id.

B.

Preservation of issue
This issue was preserved in Telfer's motion to dismiss. R. 58-67.

The trial court granted Telfer's motion to dismiss on this basis on
August 21, 2006. R.121-24.

Determinative Constitutional
Provisions, Statutes, and Rules
This appeal turns on the common law judicial proceeding
privilege. Therefore, there are no determinative constitutional
provisions, statutes, or rules.

Statement of the Case
Nature of the Case
This is an action for damages for libel and slander. R. 1-54. Appellee
Telfer was an attorney guardian ad litem appointed to represent the
3

interests of the children of Rex Strand and Renee Strand, who were
involved in a divorce. Rex Strand is appellant Michael Strand's
("Strand") brother. Appellant Cari Allen is Strand's girlfriend. Neither
Strand nor Allen was a party to the divorce action.
Telfer submitted a motion for temporary restraining order and
supporting memorandum in the divorce action. R. 17-25. The
memorandum contained certain statements about Strand and Allen
which Strand and Allen allege are false. They seek damages for libel
and slander.
Under the judicial proceeding privilege, Telfer is immune from
Strand's and Allen's claims because the allegedly false statements were
relevant to and made in the course of a judicial proceeding in which
Telfer was acting as counsel.

Course of the Proceedings and Disposition Below
In April 2006 Michael Strand and Cari Allen commenced this action
by filing a Complaint in Second District Court. R. 1-54. In addition to
Telfer, Strand and Allen named five Does as defendants. R. 1. However,
the plaintiffs never amended the complaint to name any specific
individual other than Telfer.
4

Pursuant to Telfer's motion, venue was changed to the Third District
Court and the case was assigned to the Honorable Joseph Fratto. R. 99103. Before venue was changed, Telfer filed a motion to dismiss. The
motion was fully briefed, R. 58-67, 75-86,106-13, and the parties
presented oral argument to Judge Fratto. R. 144. On August 21, 2006,
the court entered its Order Granting Motion to Dismiss and Dismissing
the Case with Prejudice. R. 121-24; Add. A. Because the plaintiffs had
never amended the complaint to add specific individuals, the trial
court's order resolved all claims against all parties. Strand and Allen
filed a notice of appeal on September 19, 2006. R. 125-26.

Statement of the Facts
The facts are taken from Strand and Allen's complaint.
In 2005 Rex Strand was involved in a divorce from his wife, Renee.
R. 2. Telfer was appointed as guardian ad litem for Rex and Renee's
children. R. 3. Rex is appellant Strand's brother. R. 2 Allen is appellant
Strand's girlfriend. Neither of the appellants was a party to the divorce
action.
When Rex and Renee separated, Rex moved in with Strand and
Allen. R.2. Some time later, Telfer filed a motion for temporary
5

restraining order and supporting memorandum in the divorce action. R.
17-25. The motion requested a change of custody to Renee during the
divorce and argued that it was not in the Strand children's best interest
to have frequent contact with Strand and Allen, or to stay in their home
while they visited their father. R. 24-25.
Strand and Allen allege that the motion and supporting
memorandum "contained numerous misstatements and [were] glutted
with salacious innuendo's [sic] involving plaintiffs Michael Strand and
Cari Allen's, lifestyles, living conditions, personal character, past
experience and dress attire." R. 3. Appellants allege that Telfer "knew
or should have known this information to be false, malicious and
wrong." R. 4.
Strand and Allen filed a complaint against Telfer raising claims for
slander and libel and seeking punitive damages. Strand and Allen seek
$400,000 in damages from Telfer. R. 15.

6

Summary of the Argument
The trial court properly dismissed Strand's and Allen's complaint
because Telfer is entitled to immunity under the judicial proceeding
privilege. Strand and Allen sued Telfer for libel and slander for
statements Telfer made in court papers she filed in her capacity as
guardian ad litem for the Strand children in their parents' divorce
action. Thus, the allegedly inaccurate statements were made by an
attorney and were relevant to and made in the course of a judicial
proceeding. Under Utah law, Telfer is immune from Strand's and
Allen's claims.

7

Argument
1. The trial court correctly granted Telfer's motion to dismiss
because Telfer is absolutely immune from claims of libel and
slander
This Court should affirm the trial court's grant of Telfer's motion to
dismiss because the court correctly ruled that Telfer is protected by the
judicial proceeding privilege.
'The general rule is that judges, jurors, witnesses, litigants, and
counsel involved in a judicial proceeding have an absolute privilege
against suits alleging defamation." Krouse, 2001 UT, <jl 8, 20 P.3d 895.
The common law judicial proceeding privilege is intended to promote
the integrity of the adjudicatory proceeding and its truth finding
processes." DeBry v. Godbe, 1999 UT 111, % 10, 992 P.2d 979.
Accordingly, "[a]n attorney at law is absolutely privileged to publish
false and defamatory matter of another in communications . . . during
the course and as part of a judicial proceeding in which [shel
participates as counsel, if it has some relation thereto." Price v. Armour,
949 P.2d 1251, 1256 (Utah 1997) (quoting Beezley v. Hansen, 4 Utah 2d
64, 286 P.2d 1057, 1058 (1955)). Attorneys are entitled to immunity
because they act '"in furtherance of [an] interest of social importance,
which is entitled to protection even at the expense of uncompensated
8

harm to the plaintiffs reputation."' Allen v. Ortez, 802 P.2d 1307,1311
(Utah 1990) (quoting W. Prosser & P. Keeton, The Law of Torts § 114
(5th ed. 1984)).
A three part test has been established to determine whether a
statement is protected by the judicial proceeding privilege. Krouse, 2001
UT, f 8, 20 P.3d 895. "To establish the judicial proceeding privilege, the
statements must be (1) "made during or in the course of a judicial
proceeding"; (2) "have some reference to the subject matter of the
proceeding"; and (3) be "made by someone acting in the capacity of
judge, juror, witness, litigant, or counsel."'" Id. (quoting DeBry, 1999
UT, f 11, 922 P.2d 979).
The trial court's application of the judicial proceeding privilege was
unquestionably correct in this case. First, Telfer made the allegedly
inaccurate statements in the course of a judicial proceeding-she
included them in support of a motion for temporary restraining order
she filed on behalf of the children in Rex and Renee's divorce case.
Second, the statements were relevant to the divorce proceeding because
they related to child custody and visitation. In fact, the purpose of the
motion was to seek a change of custody to Renee during the pendency of
the divorce proceedings. Third, the statements were made by Telfer in
9

her capacity as guardian ad litem for the children. While Strand and
Allen argue that Telfer was acting outside the scope of her duties as
guardian ad litem when she filed the motion, Op. Br. at 27-28, this is
plainly not the case.
Moreover, this case illustrates well the importance of the privilege.
Telfer's position requires her, at times, to make statements bearing on
the best interests of children that are not flattering to parents or other
family members. Telfer, along with all other guardians ad litem, would
be unduly limited in their roles as advocates if they were subjected to
liability for making such statements. Attorneys such as Telfer must be
free of the chilling effects of potential liability if they are to zealously
protect the interests of their clients. See Price, 949 P.2d at 1258.
(holding that purpose of judicial privilege is to "ensure free and open
expression by all participants in judicial proceedings by alleviating any
and all fear that participation will subject them to the risk of
subsequent legal actions").
Strand and Allen do not allege that Telfer disclosed the motion and
supporting memorandum to anyone outside the divorce proceedings.
Nevertheless, they argue on appeal that Telfer's statements were not
privileged because she published them more broadly than necessary.
10

Op. Br. at 30. Relying on Utah's child abuse reporting statutes, Strand
and Allen suggest that Telfer's submission of information to the court
constituted unnecessarily broad publication because the Division of
Child and Family Support was the only proper recipient of the
information. Id.
However, Strand and Allen did not argue before the trial court that
the elements of the judicial proceeding privilege are not met in this
case. Instead, they argued, first, that the allegations of their complaint
were sufficiently specific to pass muster under Rule 12(b)(6). R. 76-78.
Second, misapprehending the judicial proceeding privilege as a
qualified rather than an absolute privilege, they argued that Telfer
must first raise the privilege as an affirmative defense before the
burden shifted to Strand and Allen to show why the privilege should
not apply. R. 78-81.
Strand and Allen have, accordingly, waived the right to argue on
appeal that Telfer published the allegedly false statements more
broadly than necessary. '"[I]n order to preserve an issue for appeal [,]
the issue must be presented to the trial court in such a way that the
trial court has an opportunity to rule on that issue.'" 438 Main Street v.
Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, <J[ 51, 99 P.3d 801 (quoting Brookside
11

Mobile Home Park, Ltd. v. Peebles, 2002 UT 48, f 14, 48 P.3d 968)
(alterations in original). Issues not raised before the trial court are
usually deemed waived. Id.
Strand and Allen also note on appeal that prosecutors do not enjoy
absolute immunity when they perform investigatory functions. Op. Br.
at 27-28. But Telfer is not a prosecutor, the plaintiffs were not
prosecuted, and their claims against Telfer do not relate to any
investigation she performed. Strand's and Allen's claims for libel and
slander relate solely to the motion Telfer filed with the court and the
discussions she had with affiants in the course of preparing it. 1 R. 9-14.
Therefore, Telfer's investigation is not at issue.
Finally, Strand and Allen seem to suggest in their brief that Telfer
failed to follow Utah's statutory procedure for reporting child abuse and
characterize the motion filed in the divorce case as Telfer's effort to

1

Strand and Allen argue that Telfer sent an investigator to their
home to do an evaluation. Op. Br. at 27. They fault Telfer for relying
upon statements made by Renee and the children's paternal aunt and
cousin instead of statements of the investigator. Op. Br. at 19. Strand
and Allen argue that this constitutes unconstitutional suppression of
exculpatory evidence for which Telfer does not enjoy immunity. Op. Br.
at 27. However, the plaintiffs were not entitled to these protections
because they were not criminal defendants. Moreover, the investigator's
report is not in the record. Accordingly, the plaintiffs cannot show that
it was favorable to them.
12

induce the trial court to rule that Strand and Allen were guilty of child
abuse. Op. Br. at 26, 29-32. Strand and Allen correctly observe that
Utah law gives statutory immunity to those who report suspicions of
child abuse in good faith. Utah Code Ann. Section 62A-4a-410 provides:
Any person, official, or institution participating in good
faith in making a report, taking photographs or X-rays,
assisting an investigator from the division, serving as a
member of a child protection team, or taking a child into
protective custody pursuant to this part, is immune from
any liability, civil or criminal, that otherwise might result
by reason of those actions.
Strand and Allen correctly argue that the statutory immunity did
not attach in this case because Telfer did not make a report of child
abuse. Id. Nevertheless, the statutory immunity does not replace or
diminish the separate common law judicial proceeding privilege. The
elements of that privilege unquestionably are met in this case and
Strand's and Allen's complaint was properly dismissed.

Conclusion
The statements that give rise to Strand's and Allen's libel and
slander claims were made in court papers Telfer filed in her capacity as
guardian ad litem for the children in Rex and Renee's divorce action.
Telfer is an attorney and the statements were relevant to and made in
13

the course of a judicial proceeding. Under Utah law, there is no
question that Telfer is immune from Strand's and Allen's claims.
Accordingly, the trial court correctly granted Telfer's motion to dismiss
and Telfer urges this Court to affirm the judgment entered by the trial
court.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 20th day of February, 2007.

Reha Deal
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Diana Telfer
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Certificate of Service
I certify that two true and correct copies of the foregoing Answer
Brief of Appellee was served by U.S. mail, first-class postage prepaid,
this 20th day of February, 2007, to the following:
MICHAEL STRAND
CAM ALLEN
1199 South 1500 East
Bountiful, Utah 84010
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